{"id":47599,"date":"2025-11-01T10:50:56","date_gmt":"2025-11-01T07:50:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/?p=47599"},"modified":"2025-11-01T10:50:56","modified_gmt":"2025-11-01T07:50:56","slug":"europes-distorted-bet-on-cairo-raises-furore-questions-in-addis-ababa","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/47599\/","title":{"rendered":"Europe\u2019s \u201cDistorted\u201d Bet on Cairo Raises Furore, Questions in Addis Ababa"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u201cEurope once said it wanted a strong, integrated Africa. Today, it is investing in a divided one.\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"|<\/p>\n

Ethiopia watched in incredulity last week as the European Union and Egypt launched the second phase of a seven-year cooperation program in what that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has described as a \u201cdeeply disappointing and problematic\u201d move by Brussels to deepen its involvement in the long-running dispute over the use of Nile Waters.<\/p>\n

The new Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2021\u20132027 elevates Cairo as the EU\u2019s primary partner in North Africa, linking European investment and migration policy to Egypt\u2019s stability and energy infrastructure.<\/p>\n

The updated programme, unveiled in Cairo earlier this week, includes additional billions of Euros in funding. Although it was presented as part of a broader regional vision linking North Africa and Europe through renewable energy, green hydrogen, and climate adaptation, its geographic scope has tilted heavily toward Egypt and touches sensitive Ethiopian interests, particularly water governance and energy trade.<\/p>\n

A joint statement issued by Cairo and Brussels on October 24, 2025, echoed Egypt\u2019s colonial and monopolistic claims on the Nile, with the EU appearing to take a clear position on the dispute with Ethiopia for the first time.<\/p>\n

\u201cRecognizing Egypt’s heavy reliance on the Nile River in a context of its water scarcity, the EU reiterates its support to Egypt’s water security and the compliance with international law, including concerning the Ethiopian Dam. The EU strongly encourages transboundary cooperation among riparian countries based on the principles of prior notification, cooperation and \u2018do no harm,\u2019\u201d it reads.<\/p>\n

The programme comes less than two months after Ethiopia inaugurated the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and, according to the Ethiopian embassy in Brussels, \u201cshows a complete disregard for the views and interests of other riparian countries.\u201d<\/p>\n

The embassy noted that the River Nile, shared by eleven riparian countries, cannot be treated through a bilateral framework that ignores nearly half a billion people in Sub-Saharan Africa.<\/p>\n

\u201cIt is regrettable that the EU decided to undermine Ethiopia in a bilateral platform with Egypt,\u201d reads the embassy\u2019s response, accusing Brussels of adopting a \u201cbiased and hostile position\u201d contrary to the spirit of its long-standing partnership with Addis Ababa.<\/p>\n

Analysts speaking with The Reporter<\/em> say the deal, while framed as development cooperation, carries strategic undertones that could tilt regional influence in favor of Cairo at a sensitive moment in the Horn and Nile Basin politics.<\/p>\n

The Ethiopian statement marked one of the country\u2019s sharpest diplomatic responses toward the European Union in recent years. It said the EU\u2019s position contradicted international water law, particularly the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization enshrined in the UN Watercourses Convention (1997) and the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA).<\/p>\n

\u00a0\u201cThe EU\u2019s distorted take on international law is deplorable,\u201d it reads, adding that the bloc\u2019s statement runs counter to the very frameworks it has supported elsewhere in Africa.<\/p>\n

The statement further noted that Europe\u2019s approach ignored its own history as an observer in the African Union\u2013facilitated negotiations on GERD\u2014talks in which EU representatives had witnessed all parties\u2019 concerns and interests firsthand.<\/p>\n

A Horn affairs expert speaking with The Reporter <\/em>anonymously echoed the country\u2019s sentiments.<\/p>\n

\u201cWhat the bloc did last week was like shooting your own foot. The EU has long anchored itself as a strong ally of regional integration. How does siding with one and accusing the other about a matter of this magnitude cement its longstanding argument? It might not look like it from an outsider\u2019s perspective but Ethiopia has many allies, especially in this continent,\u201d the expert said.<\/p>\n

Ethiopia\u2019s government has spent more than a decade promoting its image as a driver of regional connectivity. GERD was marketed not merely as a national project, but as a continental one, a source of affordable electricity for the region and a symbol of African self-reliance.<\/p>\n

The EU\u2019s new deal with Egypt, however, pours fresh funds into Cairo\u2019s National Water Resources Plan 2037 and irrigation modernization efforts, without reference to transboundary cooperation in the Nile Basin. For officials in Addis, this silence cuts deep.<\/p>\n

\u201cIt is difficult to see how the EU can claim to support regional integration while financing projects that reinforce unilateral control of shared waters,\u201d says an Ethiopian analyst who requested anonymity. \u201cThe same Europe that preaches partnership in Addis signs deals in Cairo that exclude upstream voices.\u201d<\/p>\n

This week, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed appeared before Parliament and delivered an address that resonated far beyond domestic politics. The PM reiterated his administration\u2019s \u201cTwo Waters\u201d policy, which revolves around GERD and the Nile, maritime access, and resource sovereignty.<\/p>\n

Abiy\u2019s words offered a window into the country\u2019s growing frustration.<\/p>\n

\u201cOur demand is not new or emotional,\u201d he told lawmakers. \u201cIt is a question of national existence, a matter of survival.\u201d<\/p>\n

On maritime access, the Prime Minister reiterated that \u201cthe manner in which Ethiopia lost its access to the sea was illegal and unjust,\u201d adding that \u201cEthiopia can no longer remain in the status quo of being a \u2018geographical prisoner.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n

He insisted, however, that any resolution would be peaceful.<\/p>\n

\u201dWe don\u2019t believe that war and conflict are necessary to achieve this. That is why we have been waiting patiently for five years,\u201d said Abiy.<\/p>\n

Experts argue that the timing of the EU\u2013Egypt deal appears to sharpen Ethiopia\u2019s frustration over what officials describe as \u201cselective engagement\u201d by external actors.<\/p>\n

While Egypt is portrayed as a stable partner in the Mediterranean, Ethiopia\u2019s broader development agenda, they argue, continues to be viewed through a crisis lens.<\/p>\n

Under MIP 2021\u20132027, the EU commits hundreds of millions of Euros between 2021 and 2024 to projects in green transition, water management, and economic resilience.<\/p>\n

The plan positions Egypt as Europe\u2019s anchor state for investment and migration control \u2014 a gateway for renewable energy trade, digital connectivity, and climate cooperation across the southern Mediterranean.<\/p>\n

Some analysts argue that the EU issued the joint statement in an attempt to sideline Ethiopia or other riparian countries from shared resources as a result of Europe\u2019s apparent conviction that only Egypt can offer the predictability, scale, and access it desires in a turbulent region.<\/p>\n

To Ethiopian observers, that logic is precisely the problem. By prioritizing predictability over partnership, the EU risks alienating countries that are equally vital to Africa\u2019s integration but less convenient to manage.<\/p>\n

The deal\u2019s omission of Nile Basin cooperation, in particular, is glaring. Ethiopia\u2019s USD five billion GERD remains Africa\u2019s largest hydroelectric project, designed to serve multiple countries through power exports.<\/p>\n

Yet, in the EU\u2019s water-governance portfolio for North Africa, Ethiopia is nowhere to be found.<\/p>\n

\u201cThis is not simply a funding decision,\u201d argues an Ethiopian water policy expert. \u201cIt\u2019s a diplomatic statement that Europe\u2019s engagement on transboundary resources stops at Egypt\u2019s borders.\u201d<\/p>\n

The EU\u2013Egypt partnership also extends to migration control. This is another area where Ethiopia feels its leverage slipping. The joint statement on migration and security places Cairo at the center of Europe\u2019s southern containment strategy, tasking Egypt with managing irregular flows toward the Mediterranean.<\/p>\n

Through this arrangement, the EU channels funding for border management, surveillance, and asylum-system development, which were priorities that once formed the core of EU cooperation with the Horn of Africa under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.<\/p>\n

For Ethiopia, the reallocation is tangible. Between 2016 and 2021, EU migration funding helped support reintegration programs, job creation for returnees, and local development projects in migration-prone areas like Amhara and Tigray. Those channels have since dried up.<\/p>\n

\u201cEurope is outsourcing migration control northward,\u201d said the Horn affairs expert. \u201cWe used to be part of the conversation. Now Egypt is the conversation.\u201d<\/p>\n

The shift has strategic consequences. With the EU\u2019s attention fixed on North Africa, the Horn\u2019s voice in shaping migration policy is fading, just as irregular flows from Ethiopia and Sudan to Libya are surging, analysts contend.<\/p>\n

Energy cooperation is another pillar where Ethiopia\u2019s ambitions collide with the EU\u2019s Cairo-centric vision. Under the MIP, Europe plans to invest in Egypt\u2019s Integrated Sustainable Energy Strategy, emphasizing renewables, hydrogen, and electricity interconnection with the Mediterranean.<\/p>\n

Projects like the MEDUSA, a major high-capacity fiber optic initiative linking Southern Europe and North Africa, set to land in Port Said by 2027, epitomize this new alignment. Europe\u2019s future energy corridor to Africa now runs through Egypt\u2014not the Horn.<\/p>\n

Ethiopia, meanwhile, has staked its economic future on becoming a renewable energy exporter, leveraging hydropower from the GERD and other dams. Officials had hoped the EU members would view the Horn as a key green-energy hub.<\/p>\n

However, experts point out that the optics instead suggest that Europe is doubling down on existing trade corridors rather than building new ones across the continent.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe EU talks about a green partnership with Africa, but its investments follow the same old geography, the Mediterranean first, Sub-Saharan Africa later,\u201d said one analyst who spoke to The Reporter<\/em> anonymously.<\/p>\n

The irony is sharp. Ethiopia, whose entire development narrative rests on green growth and clean energy, now finds itself overlooked in favor of projects in Cairo.<\/p>\n

Relations between Ethiopia and the European Union have been fragile since the northern conflict in 2020. Though ties improved after the Pretoria Agreement, tensions remain over humanitarian access, governance reforms, and accountability.<\/p>\n

Following the peace agreement, there has been a “warming up” of relations, with high-level meetings between EU officials and the Ethiopian government. A significant development was the signing of a ‘Global Gateway’ Partnership Agreement in October 2025, which aims to boost cooperation and investment in key sectors.<\/p>\n

While the EU suspended direct budget support to the Ethiopian government during the peak of the war, it continued humanitarian aid to the population. European aid to Ethiopia, once exceeding a billion Euros annually, has not fully recovered. Addis Ababa\u2019s access to comparable funding mechanisms has diminished, particularly as the EU redirects attention to the Sahel and the southern Mediterranean.<\/p>\n

Since the 2022 peace deal, the EU has gradually reinstated development financing, focusing on post-conflict reconstruction, health services, education, and food security. This includes a 240 million Euro grant under the 2024 Annual Action Programme (AAP-2024) in April 2025, and a 90 million Euro financing agreement for AAP-2025 in October 2025. These funds target development in areas such as agribusiness, digitalization, and the restoration of basic services in conflict-affected regions.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Against this backdrop, the EU\u2013Egypt partnership feels to many Ethiopians like a diplomatic downgrading. It contrasts sharply with the EU\u2019s earlier role as a mediator and developmental ally during Ethiopia\u2019s reform years between 2018 and 2020.<\/p>\n

A senior foreign relations expert puts it bluntly: \u201cEurope once said it wanted a strong, integrated Africa. Today, it is investing in a divided one.\u201d<\/p>\n

For many Ethiopians, at the heart of the matter also lies a contradiction between Europe\u2019s rhetoric and its regional conduct. The EU\u2019s New Agenda for the Mediterranean and its Economic and Investment Plan for the Southern Neighbourhood frame the Union as a partner for African integration, inclusive growth, and shared prosperity.<\/p>\n

Yet, the geographic concentration of funding being overwhelmingly in North Africa reinforces rather than bridges Africa\u2019s north\u2013south divide, according to observers.<\/p>\n

In Ethiopia, this is seen as hypocrisy. Officials recall how European diplomats routinely call for \u201cAfrican solutions to African problems.\u201d But when it comes to the Nile, Europe funds one side\u2019s adaptation and leaves the other\u2019s aspirations unaddressed.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe EU\u2019s credibility as a promoter of regional integration is at stake,\u201d says a political expert speaking anonymously. \u201cIf integration only means connecting North Africa to Europe, then what is Africa\u2019s role?\u201d<\/p>\n

For Addis Ababa, the EU\u2019s move comes at a delicate time. Ethiopia is reasserting its regional leadership, expanding ties with the Gulf, and seeking new maritime and trade outlets through the Red Sea.<\/p>\n

Abiy Ahmed\u2019s recent parliamentary remarks capture the urgency of that quest.<\/p>\n

\u201cWe did not build our maritime [capacity] to put it in a glass of water,\u201d said the Prime Minister, as he held up a glass half-full of water in front of lawmakers.<\/p>\n

Analysts note that the Prime Minister\u2019s insistence on peaceful means is both a reassurance and a warning: Ethiopia will not abandon its pursuit of access to the sea, but it prefers diplomacy over confrontation.<\/p>\n

Still, they contend that Ethiopia\u2019s room for maneuver is narrowing. With Eritrea unyielding, Djibouti heavily commercialized, and Somalia entangled in its own crises, Ethiopia needs credible partners.<\/p>\n

Europe, once viewed as a bridge to consensus, now appears aligned elsewhere.<\/p>\n

The EU\u2019s partnership with Egypt is also reshaping continental diplomacy. Foreign relations experts note that Egypt\u2019s dual identity as both Arab and African allows it to operate in two arenas at once, a flexibility that Addis Ababa, despite hosting the African Union, cannot easily replicate.<\/p>\n

\u201cIf Europe channels more investment and policy coordination through Egypt, the African Union itself could feel the ripple. Egypt\u2019s influence within continental institutions may rise, while the Horn\u2019s strategic weight could diminish,\u201d said one analyst.<\/p>\n

This dynamic is not lost on Ethiopian policymakers. Despite the strong language, the Ethiopian statement concluded on a constructive note, saying the country \u201clooks forward to engaging the EU and its member states to rectify the gross and wrongful positions reflected in the \u2018Joint Statement.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n

In diplomatic terms, analysts say that this suggests Ethiopia is not seeking confrontation but recalibration, a signal that dialogue remains open, provided Europe acknowledges Ethiopia\u2019s rights and contributions.<\/p>\n

Observers note this balanced assertiveness could mark a turning point in Ethiopia\u2019s diplomacy with the EU, combining principled firmness with an invitation to reset the relationship.<\/p>\n

As the EU\u2013Egypt partnership deepens through 2027, Europe\u2019s engagement with Africa appears increasingly defined by geography, migration, and security interests rather than shared development vision.<\/p>\n

For Ethiopia, the challenge will be to navigate this changing landscape\u2014protecting its interests on the Nile, maintaining strategic partnerships, and asserting its leadership within the African Union.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u201cEurope once said it wanted a strong, integrated Africa. Today, it is investing in a divided one.\u201d Ethiopia watched in incredulity last week as the European Union and Egypt launched the second phase of a seven-year cooperation program in what that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has described as a \u201cdeeply disappointing and problematic\u201d move […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":68,"featured_media":47603,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"editor_plus_copied_stylings":"{}","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1957],"tags":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-47599","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-in-depth"},"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/47599","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/68"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=47599"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/47599\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/47603"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=47599"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=47599"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thereporterethiopia.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=47599"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}